Official Immunity in Kentucky: The New Standard Under Yanero v. Davis by Barker, G. Thomas
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 90 | Issue 3 Article 5
2002
Official Immunity in Kentucky: The New Standard
Under Yanero v. Davis
G. Thomas Barker
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barker, G. Thomas (2002) "Official Immunity in Kentucky: The New Standard Under Yanero v. Davis," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 90 :
Iss. 3 , Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol90/iss3/5
NOTES
Official Immunity in Kentucky:
The New Standard Under Yanero v. Davis
BY G. THOMAS BARKER"
INTRODUCTION
0 n November 21, 2001, the Kentucky Supreme Court issued its
latest attempt to establish a workable and fair standard to apply the
doctrines of sovereign and official immunity. With Yanero v. Davis, the
court completely overhauled the approach to these doctrines.! The court
faced a tremendous task in rewriting their application. Sovereign and
official immunity are fraught with theoretical and practical issues that for
many years have divided courts and perplexed jurists in their search for the
decisive benchmark to resolve a case. However, in spite of valid jurispru-
dential and constitutional concerns,2 sovereign and official immunity have
been a part of the laws of this Commonwealth even before the adoption of
its first constitution,3 and they remain so today. Indeed, Yanero represents
* J.D. expected 2003, University of Kentucky. The author would like to thank
Bryan H. Beauman for his insight and assistance.
'Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001).
2 One such critical issue advanced by opponents of a broad application for the
immunity doctrines is that they cut against one of the fundamental purposes of
utilizing a court system--the peaceful, equitable, and just resolution of a grievance
or personal injury. They argue that the doctrines deny an individual's right to bring
an action to seek legal remedy, and thus should be limited in application. Cullinan
v. Jefferson County, 418 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Ky. 1967) (Palmore, J. dissenting)).
However, proponents of a more expansive shield respond that the doctrines are
crucial in insulating government entities from legal action that would prevent them
from efficiently and effectively carrying forward their official business. See, e.g.,
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 517-18; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D cmt. c
(1977).
3 Wood v. Bd. of Educ., 412 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Ky. 1967).
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the Kentucky Supreme Court's most recent endeavor to create a system that
removes the guesswork from applying these doctrines. This case is an
attempt to provide practitioners with a logical and uniform approach that
balances fairness to injured plaintiffs with preservation of the sanctity of
governing bodies.4
Sovereign and official immunity have long stood as a liability shield
protecting the state, its agencies, and the individual agents who perform the
government's work.' Kentucky common law recognized this defense as
early as 1828.6 While Yanero discusses both sovereign and official
immunity, this Note will focus solely on official immunity, the defense
available for the actions of government agents.7 In so doing, the Note will
examine the new immunity standard, both in its current application to the
individual agents, and from a historical perspective, noting the impact of
the changes to the previous structure.
Part I analyzes the Yanero decision and sets forth the new model
outlining whether a government agent's actions qualify for immunity.8 Part
I compares and contrasts the Yanero decision with the discarded immunity
paradigm established in Franklin County v. Malone. Part I further
examines Yanero by discussing its relationship with a competing theory
regarding the immunity of government agents developed in Happy v.
Erwin. ° Part IV continues this discussion by analyzing the Kentucky jural
4 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 510.
' See id.
6 Id. (citing Divine v. Harvie, 23 Ky. (7 T.B. Mon.) 439,441 (1828)).
7 Sovereign and official immunity are separate and distinct doctrines. Sovereign
immunity refers to the immunity available for the actions of the state and its
counties. Official immunity is a defense for the actions of individuals employed
and operating on behalf of state, county, and municipal governments. See generally
Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that official immunity is
based on functionperformed, not on status); Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 510; Thompson
v. Huecker, 559 S.W.2d 488, 494-96 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (discussing the
application of official immunity); 63C AM. JUR. 2DPublic Officers and Employees
§ 309 (1997).
8 See discussion infra Part I.
9 Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1997), overruledby Yanero,
65 S.W.3d at 510; see discussion infra Part II.
i0 Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1959); see discussion infra Part m.
The Happy line of cases includes: Calvert Invs., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Metro. Sewer Dist., 805 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1991); Bd. of Trs. v. Hayse, 782
S.W.2d 609 (Ky. 1989), overruled by Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523; Gould v.
O'Bannon, 770 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1989); Univ. of Louisville v. O'Bannon, 770
S.W.2d 215 (Ky. 1989); Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1982); Saylor v.
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rights doctrine and the impact of sections 14, 54, 231, and 241 of the
Kentucky Constitution." Part V concludes with a discussion of how the
Yanero decision will impact future cases, examining how several recent
decisions would have been resolved differently under the Yanero doctrine. 2
The new official immunity standard is of great consequence to both the
legal community and the individuals residing in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky. This new approach impacts one of the most fundamental and
sacred rights of an individual-the right to seek judicial remedy for the
injurious actions of another.
I. YANERO AND THE NEW OFFICIAL IMMUNITY APPROACH
In Yanero v. Davis, Ryan Yanero, age fifteen, was injured when he was
struck in the head by a baseball thrown by Ryan Coker, a teammate of
Yanero's on the Waggener High School junior varsity baseball team. 3 The
injury occurred while Coker was pitching in the high school gym's batting
cage. Yanero was not wearing a helmet while batting. 4 Yanero brought suit
in the Jefferson Circuit Court against the Jefferson County Board of
Education; Robert Stewart, Waggener's athletic director; Allen Davis, a
varsity assistant coach assigned to coach the junior varsity baseball team;
Jeffery Becker, another varsity assistant coach assigned to help with the
junior varsity team; and the Kentucky High School Athletic Association
("KHSAA"). 5 This Note will consider only the claims made against the
individual government agents-Stewart, Davis, and Becker. Yanero alleged
that Stewart, Davis, and Becker negligently failed to require him to wear
a helmet while participating in batting practice. 6 The Jefferson Circuit
Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Kentucky
Court of Appeals affirmed. 7 In a unanimous decision, the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgments entered in favor of the
Jefferson County Board of Education, Stewart," and the KHSAA, and
Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Speck v. Bowling, 892 S.W.2d 309 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1995); Blue v. Pursell, 793 S.W.2d 823 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
"See discussion infra Part IV.
'
2 See discussion infra Part V.





181d. at 531. Stewart was treated differently from Davis and Becker because the
court found that he acted in good faith and in his discretionary authority. As will
be discussed in detail in the following pages, this finding entitled him to the official
2001-2002]
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reversed the summary judgments entered in favor of Davis and Becker. 9
In its opinion, the court outlined the new application of official immunity
to governmental officers and employees.20
Essentially, Yanero holds that "public employees, while acting in their
individual capacities, do not share the immunity of the governmental unit
for which they work."'" Furthermore, "[r]ather than sharing their govern-
ment employer's immunity, public employees acting in their individual
capacities are entitled only to official immunity for their discretionary acts
occurring within the scope of their employment and to no immunity for
their ministerial acts." Official immunity is afforded to government
officers and employees based on the action or function they perform, not
because of their status as an officer or employee.23 Moreover, official
immunity comes in two varieties-absolute and qualified. 4 Absolute
official immunity applies when a government officer or employee is sued
in his official or "representative" capacity.25 When a government agent is
sued in his official capacity, he qualifies for the same immunity for his
actions as is afforded under the sovereign immunity doctrine to the state
and state agencies.26 Qualified immunity is relevant when the officer or
employee is sued in his individual capacity.27 It applies, negating the officer
or employee's negligent actions when: (1) he performed a discretionary
immunity defense. Id. at 528-29.
19Id. at 531.20 Id. at 521-23.
..-21 Ky. Bd. of Claims v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896, 898-99 (Ky. 2001) (citing
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522).
2 Id. at 899 (citing Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522).
23 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521 (citing Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374 (6th Cir.
1989)).
24 Id. at 522 (citing 63C AM. JR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 309
(1997)).
2 Id.
26 Id. There are several examples of government agents that clearly have abso-
lute official immunity from suit: government prosecutors, judges, and state
legislators. Id. at 518. The reason a government agent may receive absolute
immunity flowing from the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that when he is sued
in his official capacity, the suit is essentially considered an action against the entity
itself. Thus, the government agent may receive absolute official immunity because
of the sovereign immunity afforded to the government entity. Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 164-66 (1985).
27 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522 (citing 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and
Employees § 309 (1997)).
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action or function; (2) his action was taken in good faith; and (3) his action
was within the scope of his authority as an employee or officer.28
The Yanero decision resolves a key inconsistency in Kentucky law
regarding the application of official immunity. In 1989 the Kentucky
Supreme Court held, in Board of Trustees v. Hayse, that "the 'official
immunity doctrine,' which protects a government official in making
decisions involving the exercise ofdiscretion .... protects decision making
by a public official only if his acts are not otherwise wrongful."'29 This
statement suggests that a public officer or employee acting within the scope
of her employment can never qualify for immunity if she acted negligently
or wrongfully in the performance of her official duties." Almost eight years
after Hayse, the Kentucky Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion
in Franklin County v. Malone.3 Malone held that "[a]s long as the police
officer acts within the scope of the authority of office, the actions are those
of the government and the officer is entitled to the same immunity."32 This
conclusion is in direct opposition to Hayse, since Malone says that a
government officer or employee acting within the scope of her employment
would always be immune from liability for negligent performance of her
official responsibilities. 3 Yanero overrules both of these cases.34
Yanero holds that government officials and employees do not qualify
for official immunity for any negligent ministerial actions. 5 The terms
21 Id. (citing 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 309 (1997);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D cnt. g (1977)).29 Bd. of Trs. v. Hayse, 782 S.W.2d 609, 615 (Ky. 1989), overruled by Yanero,
65 S.W.3d at 523, cited in Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521.
'o Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521.
31 Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1997), overruled by
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523.32Id. at 202, cited in Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521.33 See Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521. When the Kentucky Supreme Court decided
Malone, it did not actually overrule Hayse. The court in Hayse found that official
immunity did not apply in the case because the doctrine is not available to claims
"grounded in constitutionally impermissible misconduct." Hayse, 782 S.W.2d at
615. Prior to Yanero, Malone outlined the applicable standard for official
immunity. See Malone, 957 S.W.2d at 195. The court in Hayse, however,
disqualified official immunity as a defense without ever fully discussing its
standard of applicability. Hayse, 782 S.W.2d at 609. Justice Cooper, the author of
Yanero, simply uses these holdings to create a paradox in order to demonstrate the
overwhelming need to rewrite and clarify Kentucky law in this area. Yanero, 65
S.W.3d at 521-23.
14 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523.
351 Id. at 522.
2001-2002]
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"discretionary" and "ministerial" are very difficult to define in application.
In Upchurch v. Clinton County,36 the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the
Commonwealth's highest court at the time, defined "discretionary" as that
which:
necessarily require[s] the exercise of reason in the adaptation of means to
an end, and discretion in determining how or whether the act shall be done
or the course pursued. Discretion in the manner of the performance of an
act arises when the act may be performed in one or two or more ways,
either of which would be lawful, and where it is left to the will or
judgment of the performer to determine in which way it shall be per-
formed.37
Conversely, a "ministerial" action is one that is "absolute, certain, and
imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act arising from fixed
and designated facts. 38 Moreover, "an act is not necessarily taken out of
the class styled 'ministerial' because the officer performing it is vested with
a discretion respecting the means or method to be employed.' 39 In fact,
"that a necessity may exist for the ascertainment of [when an act is
absolute, certain, and imperative] does not operate to convert the [ministe-
rial] act into one.discretionary in its nature."4 Under the Yanero standard,
discretionary actions taken by a government officer or employee can
qualify for the official immunity defense, provided the actions were taken
within the scope of his employment and in good faith.41 However, if the
government agent is engaged in a ministerial action, he cannot be eligible
for this defense.42
36Upchurch v. Clinton County, 330 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. 1959).
37 Id. at 430. See also Kea-Ham Contracting, Inc. v. Floyd County Dev. Auth.,
37 S.W.3d 703, 707 (Ky. 2001); Commonwealth v. Frost, 172 S.W.2d 905, 909
(Ky. 1943).
38 Upchurch, 330 S.W.2d at 430 (quoting 43 AM. JUR. Public Officers § 258),
cited in Kea-Ham Contracting, 37 S.W.3d at 707. See also Frost, 172 S.W.2d at
909.
39 Upchurch, 330 S.W.2d at 430 (quoting 43 AM. JUR. Public Officers § 258),
cited in Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 201 (Ky. 1997), overruled
by Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523.
41 Upchurch, 330 S.W.2d at 430 (quoting 43 AM. JUR. Public Officers §
258).
41 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522; see also Ky. Bd. of Claims v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d
896, 899 (Ky. 2001).
42 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522.
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In Yanero, the Kentucky Supreme Court borrows the same basic good
faith language used by the United States Supreme Court in Wood v.
Strickland43 and Harlow v. Fitzgerald." The good faith requirement is
defined as having both an objective and subjective element45 The Kentucky
Supreme Court notes that "[t]he objective element involves a presumptive
knowledge of and respect for 'basic, unquestioned constitutional rights."'"
The subjective component requires "permissible intentions."' Ultimately,
the Kentucky Supreme Court adopts a good faith standard referring to both
these elements: "if an official 'knew or reasonably should have known that
the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other
injury,"' then the individual would not qualify for the defense.48 Thus, a
government officer or agent may not claim immunity when he knowingly
violated an individual's clearly established right or if he willfully or
maliciously intended to harm another or acted with a corrupt motive.4 9
Another component to the new official immunity approach is a process
for shifting the burden of proof.5 0 Yanero holds that "[o]nce the officer or
employee has shown prima facie that the act was performed within the
scope of his/her discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
establish by direct or circumstantial evidence that the discretionary act was
not performed in good faith."'" Thus, if the defendant government agent is
able to show that he acted within his discretionary authority, the plaintiff
can defeat a summary judgment motion only if he can show the defendant
acted in bad faith. 2
43 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
4' Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). In Yanero, the Kentucky
Supreme Court does not completely adopt the exact federal good faith standard.
Yanero merely uses some of the same language in defining its standard. Yanero, 65
S.W.3d at 523.
41 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815).
46 Id. (quoting Wood, 420 U.S. at 322).
47 d. (quoting Wood, 420 U.S. at322). The subjective element ofthe good faith
test essentially has been disregarded in federal court analysis. See SHELDON H.
NAHMOD, 2 CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATIoN § 8:4 (4th ed. 200 1).
48 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815).491 Id. (citing 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees, § 333 (1997)).
50 Id.
511d. (citing Wegener v. City of Covington, 933 F.2d 390,392 (6th Cir. 1991),
as modified by, Cox v. Ky. Dept. of Transp. 53 F.3d 146, 152 (6th Cir. 1995)).52 Id.
2001-2002]
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The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Yanero completely
reformulates Kentucky's approach to the application of official immunity
to government agents. As noted earlier, the court reversed the Jefferson
Circuit Court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals grants of summary
judgment entered in favor of Davis and Becker, the government agents. 3
The Kentucky Supreme Court found that the government agents acted
according to their ministerial authority, and therefore did not qualify for the
official immunity defense under the new standard.' The Yanero decision
attempts to remove the ambiguities from the application of sovereign and
official immunity and create a system that can be uniformly applied to all
future immunity cases. Yanero is of great importance because it overrules
Hayse and Malone, two contradictory cases espousing polar opposite
approaches to the official immunity defense.55 To further analyze the
significance of this decision, Part II will outline the former approach to
official immunity. This continued analysis will allow Yanero 's changes to
be understood more clearly.
II. How YANERO CHANGED THE STANDARD IN MALONE
In Franklin County v. Malone,56 a wrongful death action, the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that the Franklin County Jailer, the members of the
Franklin County Fiscal Court, the County Attorney, Kentucky State
Trooper Dennis Stockton, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and Franklin
County, Kentucky, were all entitled to sovereign and official immunity. The
court granted summary judgment for each of these entities and individuals,
shielding them from potential negligence liability resulting from the suicide
of Joseph Bums, an inmate in the Franklin County Jail. This Note will
focus only on the government officials and employees named in the suit.
InMalone, the Kentucky Supreme Court established a three-step model
to apply official immunity. 7 In Step I, the court considered whether the
government agent was being sued in his or her "official" or "individual
capacity."58 "Official capacity" and individual or "personal capacity" were
13 Id. at 531. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
14 Id. at 529.
55 Id. at 523. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
s Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1997), overruled by
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523.57Id. at 201; see also Turner v. Newport Bd. of Educ., 2000 WL 1364429 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2000) (applying the Malone model).
-
8Malone, 957 S.W.2d at 201.
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defined in the United States Supreme Court decisionKentucky v. Graham.9
The court wrote that "[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose personal
liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state
law."6 However, "[o]fficial-capacity suits, in contrast, 'generally represent
only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
is an agent."6 The Court further noted that:
[a]s long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to
respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be
treated as a suit against the entity.... Thus, while an award of damages
against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only against
the official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages
judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity
itself.62
If the plaintiff sued the defendant in his official capacity, then official
immunity applied, 3 provided the government employer passed the test set
forth in Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Berns.' The two-pronged Berns
test (which is unaffected by the Yanero decision) holds that a government
entity is entitled to sovereign immunity if it: (1) is under the "direction and
control of the central State government," and (2) is "supported by monies
which are disbursed by authority of the Commissioner of Finance out of the
State treasury."6 Additionally, the court must examine whether the entity
was performing an integral state function.' The Berns test is relevant under
the Malone model because if an individual were sued in her official
capacity, the immunity she could potentially receive would flow from the
immunity afforded to the state entity.67 Thus, for the individual to qualify
9 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).60Id. at 165.
611d. (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 n.55 (1978)).62Id. at 166.
63 See also Malone, 957 S.W.2d at 201; Calvert Invs., Inc v. Louisville &
Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 805 S.W.2d 133, 139 (Ky. 1991); Turner v.
Newport Bd. of Educ., 2000 WL 1367729 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000).
64 Ky. Ctr. for the Arts v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1991).
6 Id. at 331 (quoting Gnau v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer
Dist., 346 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Ky. 1961)).66 Id. at 332.
67 See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (An official-capacity suit "is not a suit against
the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.").
2001-2002]
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for immunity, the government entity had to first satisfy the Berns test. Ifthe
agent were sued in his or her individual capacity, then the analysis
proceeded to step 11.68
Step II of the Malone test asked whether the agent acted in his
discretionary or his ministerial authority.69 If the agent acted within his
discretionary authority, and his actions were within the general scope of
that authority, then absolute official immunity applied, absolving him from
liability." However, if the agent acted within his ministerial authority, the
analysis proceeded to step 1Il.7
Step I declared that a government agent can be cloaked with official
immunity for ministerial actions, only if such actions were "within the
scope of the authority of office," performing an operation within the
"traditional role of government," whose dealings could only be performed
by a government agent.72 With this step, the Malone court announced
another avenue that allows a government agent to escape liability for his
actions. Even if the agent was acting within his ministerial authority,
sovereign immunity could still apply if his actions were closely tied to the
function of state government.73 Note that in Malone, the court mistakenly
referred to "sovereign" immunity given to government employees and
agents, when it should have said "official" immunity was afforded to these
individuals.74 Traditionally, ministerial actions were not entitled to
sovereign or official immunity.75 However, Malone held that if the
ministerial actions met this final test, then such actions were sufficiently
those of the state and thus entitled to immunity.76
Given this model for determining when sovereign (i.e., official)
immunity applied, the Malone court found that the government agent,
Kentucky State Trooper Stockton, was entitled to immunity pursuant to
step III of the model.77 Stockton, in booking the decedent, Joseph R. Bums,
68Malone, 957 S.W.2d at 201.
69 Id.
70 Id.; see also Gould v. O'Bannon, 770 S.W.2d 220, 221-22 (Ky. 1989);
Thompson v. Huecker, 559 S.W.2d 488, 496 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).71 Malone, 957 S.W.2d at 202.72Id.
73 id.
74 See supra note 7. Sovereign and official immunity are separate and distinct
doctrines. One of the major problems with the Malone decision is that the court
used the terms interchangeably. See Malone, 957 S.W.2d at 202.
75 Upchurch v. Clinton County, 330 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Ky. 1959).





Jr., for incarceration, allegedly failed to adequately search his person and
discover Bums' concealed pocketknife. 8 Bums committed suicide with the
weapon in the bathroom of the Franklin County Jail while he awaited
formal processing.79 The court held that even though the search of an
individual was a ministerial act, Trooper Stockton was entitled to official
immunity because his actions were closely tied to the functioning of state
government, under step III of the model.80 As such, Trooper Stockton was
found to have acted within the scope of his employment, and because a
lawful search of an individual following an arrest can only be performed
by an agent of the government, his actions satisfied the "traditional role
of government" requirement."1 Thus, Malone, the administratrix and
personal representative of the Joseph Bums estate, was unable to recover
any damages from Trooper Stockton or any of the other named
defendants.'
The most significant change the Yanero decision makes is the
elimination of step I of the Malone analysis. 3 Under Yanero, a govern-
ment agent cannot qualify for official immunity if engaged in a ministerial
action, regardless of whether the agent was acting in the traditional role of
government.' Additionally, the Yanero approach requires further analysis
into whether an agent's discretionary actions should qualify for official
immunity. 5 Under Malone, a government agent was entitled to official
immunity for a discretionary action as long as his action was within the
scope of his employment.8 6 Now, according to Yanero, not only must a
government agent act within the scope of his employment, but he must also
satisfy the good faith requirement.8 7
Also new is the burden shifting process. Under the Malone model, the
defendant carried the burden of proof to establish that he was entitled to the
official immunity defense.8 Under Yanero, the burden is still on the
defendant to show that his actions were discretionary; the plaintiff,
however, now may overcome the defendant's showing that his actions were




21 Id. at 205.83 Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001).84Id.
85 Id.
86 Malone, 957 S.W.2d at 202.
11 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522-23.
'
8 Malone, 957 S.W.2d at 202.
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discretionary by proving that the government agent's action was taken in
bad faith. 9
The major effect of these changes is to decrease the availability of the
official immunity defense for the actions of government officers and
employees. By disallowing any immunity for ministerial actions, the court
prevents the defense from being used in numerous situations. For example,
if the Malone facts were held to the Yanero standard to qualify for official
immunity, the defense would not have been available for Trooper
Stockton." This means that more negligence actions against government
agents can proceed to trial rather than being disposed of by summary
judgment based on official immunity. Yanero widens the courthouse doors
for injured plaintiffs who otherwise would have no available legal recourse
against a government agent. Moreover, the official immunity defense may
be increasingly difficult to assert successfully because of the added
requirement that the government agent must have acted in good faith.
Part III of this Note continues the analysis of the background and
operation of official immunity by examining several issues left unresolved
by the Yanero decision, as well as several factors that may have influenced
the development of this approach.
III. YANERO'SRELATIONSHIP TO HAPPYv ERWIN
While Yanero does remove the ambiguities in the law of official
immunity caused by the conflicting Malone and Hayse decisions, it does
not resolve all the uncertainties surrounding official immunity. There is
another line of cases regarding the application of official immunity that the
Yanero court does not address. This line of cases springs from the decision
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals (then Kentucky's highest court) in
Happy v. Erwin.9 Interestingly, nowhere in the Happy court's opinion was
sovereign or official immunity discussed.92 However, plaintiffs opposed to
the application of this defense have cited this case, or line of cases,
frequently.93 The line of cases originating from Happy provides that the
89 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523.
90 Trooper Stockton was held to have been engaged in a ministerial act-
performing a routine search of an arrested individual's person. See supra notes 76-
80 and accompanying text. Yanero clearly disallows the official immunity defense
for any and all ministerial actions. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522.
9' Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1959).
92 see id.93 See, e.g., Calvert Invs., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer
Dist., 805 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1991); Bd. ofTrs. v. Hayse, 782 S.W.2d 609,615 (Ky.
1989), overruled by Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523; Gould v. O'Bannon, 770 S.W.2d
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application of official immunity should be limited, that an individual's right
to suit should be protected,94 and that Kentucky Constitution sections 14,
54, and 241 serve to prohibit the abolition or diminution of legal remedies
for personal injuries. 5 They further support the argument that "[i]t was the
manifest purpose of the framers of [the Kentucky Constitution] to preserve
and perpetuate the common-law right of a citizen injured by the negligent
act of another to sue to recover damages for his injury."96 Although Yanero
and Happy seem to be theoretically opposed-Yanero clearly defends the
doctrine of official immunity," while Happy argues for the preservation of
an individual's right to suit98 -Yanero does not overrule Happy or the line
of cases supporting its conclusion."
In Happy, the defendant, Erwin, was operating a fire truck owned by
the city of Mayfield, Kentucky in response to a call by the city of
Murray."° En route to the call, Erwin was involved in a motor vehicle
accident that caused injury to the plaintiff, Happy.101 The defendant argued
that Kentucky Revised Statute ("K.R.S.") § 95.830(2) prevented the
plaintiff from asserting a claim." At the time of the case, this statute
provided,
Neither the city nor its officers or employees shall be liable in any
manner on account of the use of the apparatus at any point outside of the
corporate limits of the city. The apparatus shall be deemed to be employed
in the exercise of a governmental function of the city.103
Based on this statute, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint.'
220,222 (Ky. 1989); Univ. of Louisville v. O'Bannon, 770 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Ky.
1989); Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. 1982); Saylor v. Hall, 497
S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1973); Speck v. Bowling, 892 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1995); Blue v. Pursell, 793 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
94 See supra note 93.
95 Blue, 793 S.W.2d at 825; see also Carney, 646 S.W.2d at 40; Saylor, 497
S.W.2d at 222-23; Happy, 330 S.W.2d at 413.
9 Saylor, 497 S.W.2d at 222-23 (quoting Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347,
351 (Ky. 1932)).97 Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 521-23 (Ky. 2001).
98 Happy, 330 S.W.2d at 413.
9 See Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521-23.
100 Happy, 330 S.W.2d at 413.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 95.830(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1955)
(amended 1966)).104 Id.
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On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he should be allowed to assert his
cause of action against the defendant Erwin so that he could recover on
insurance liability policies covering the defendant."0 5 The issue became the
constitutionality of this statute limiting the firefighter's liability.' 6 The
Happy court held that this statute was not constitutional because it violated
sections 14 and 54 of the Kentucky Constitution." 7 Section 14 of the
Kentucky Constitution provides that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every
person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial or delay."' 08 Section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution
provides that "[t]he General Assembly shall have no power to limit the
amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to
person or property."'0 9 Coupled with section 241, " 0 sections 14 and 54
have been construed to create the "open courts" or "jural rights" doctrine,
utilized to protect the rights of individuals to bring suit to recover
damages."1
The defendants in Happy argued that "the liability of public servants
is a matter of public policy for the legislature to determine.""' The court
rejected this argument, concluding instead that the legislature's public
policy cannot supersede the public policy expressed in the Kentucky
Constitution." 3 The court ultimately held that, based on sections 14 and 54
of the Kentucky Constitution, K.R.S. § 95.830(2) was an unconstitutional
restraint on an individual's right to sue to recover damages for injuries done




,o8 Id. (quoting KY. CONST. § 14).
,09 Id. (quoting Ky. CONST. § 54).
"0 Section 241 of the Kentucky Constitution probably would have been cited
in Happy also, but it only applies when death results from negligence. KY. CONST.
§ 241. No plaintiffs died in Happy. See Happy, 330 S.W.2d at 413.
"' See Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932). The doctrine ofjural
rights is a legal theory first recognized by Kentucky courts in Ludwig. This
common law doctrine, based on sections 14, 54, and 241 of the Kentucky
Constitution, holds that the legislature cannot limit or abolish an individual's right
to seek, through the court system, legal remedy for damages to their person or
property. Id. at 351.





using this decision as precedent to bar the application of sovereign and
official immunity." 5 While this Note is primarily concerned with official
immunity, it is important to observe that Happy has been cited in connec-
tion with both sovereign and official immunity doctrines." 6
Plaintiffs injured by a government agent have utilized the Happy
decision to argue that sovereign and official immunity should be limited in
scope. Several cases have reiterated the argument that the purpose of the
Kentucky Constitution is to protect an individual's right to remedy any
damage to his person or property." 7 In Blue v. Pursell, Gould v. 0 'Bannon
and University ofLouisville v. O'Bannon, the plaintiffs successfully argued
that official immunity should not apply to doctors working for government
institutions in medical malpractice actions." 8 Interestingly, all three cases
cite the same language from Saylor v. Hall " 9 regarding the desire to protect
an individual's right to suit. 2
In CalvertInvestments, Inc. v. Louisville &Jefferson County Metropol-
itan SewerDistrict, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the metropolitan
sewer district was not entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity.'2'
Here, the court wrote that "as duty requires, we defer to the sovereign
immunity of the central state government mandated by §§ 230 and 23 1of
the Constitution, but we reject extending sovereign immunity beyond'what
the Constitution demands.'"' Furthermore, it stated that "[t]he concept
that the government can do no wrong or that the government cannot afford
to compensate those whom it wrongs in circumstances where a private
entity would be required to pay is unacceptable in a just society."'" Justice
Palmore, author of this opinion, quoted Abraham Lincoln, who stated that
"[i]t is as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice against
"
5 See supra note 93.
16 See supra note 93.
11' See Gould v. O'Bannon, 770 S.W.2d 220, 222 (Ky. 1989); Univ. of
Louisville v. O'Bannon, 770 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Ky. 1989); Blue v. Pursell, 793
S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
"' Gould, 770 S.W.2d at 222; O'Bannon, 770 S.W.2d at217; Blue, 793 S.W.2d
at 825.
" Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 222-23 (Ky. 1973).
120 Gould, 770 S.W.2d at 222; O'Bannon, 770 S.W.2d at217; Blue, 793 S.W.2d
at 825.21 Calvert Invs., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 805
S.W.2d 133, 139 (Ky. 1991).
" Id. at 138 (quoting Cullinan v. Jefferson County, 418 S.W.2d 407, 411
(Ky.1967) (Palmore, J., dissenting)).123Id.
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itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer the same between private
individuals."'2 4
In Speck v. Bowling, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that official
immunity did not apply to a Kentucky State Trooper who negligently
operated his vehicle, causing injuries to the plaintiffs. 25 The court reasoned
that, "[c]learly, individuals are not afforded immunity for their negligence
merely because of their status as state employees."' 6 It stated further that
"[w]hen the government or its agent engaged in an activity normally
undertaken by private individuals in the course of their everyday lives, a
duty arises under the common law to exercise reasonable care in the
performance of the task."'27 In this case, "[g]overmmental employees, like
ordinary citizens, must operate their vehicles in a reasonable safe manner
and avoid creating foreseeably unreasonable risks of harm to the motoring
public."'12
8
It is critical to note that according to Turner v. Newport Board of
Education, an unpublished decision rendered by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals ten months before Yanero, "the Malone Court did not overrule any
of the long line of cases [the Happy line] holding that the immunity of the
Commonwealth does not extend to the personal liability of its agents,
servants, and employees."'2 9 Although Yanero clearly overrules Malone,
Yanero takes a more restrictive stance on the application of official
immunity. 3' Thus, ifMalone did not overrule Happy, then Yanero does not
either. The discrepancy between Yanero and Happy identifies the problem
that in Kentucky law there exist two opposite theories regarding the
application of immunity for negligent acts by government agents. Further
complicating this issue is the doctrine of jural rights. Fortunately, these
decisions can be harmonized to determine the status of Kentucky law in this
area. Part IV will analyze the relationship between Yanero and Happy and
consider the impact of the jural rights doctrine.
124 Id. (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Annual State of the Union Message
(Dec. 3, 1861)).
'25 Speck v. Bowling, 892 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995). This case was
given negative treatment by Jones v. Lathramn, 2000 WL 1675863, at *2 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2000) (stating that Malone supersedes Speck).
126 Speck, 892 S.W.2d at 311.
127 Id. (quoting Letowt v. City of Norwalk, 579 A.2d 601, 603 (Conn. 1989)).
12 8 Id. (quoting Letowt, 579 A.2d at 603).
129 Turner v. Newport Bd. of Educ., 2000 WL 1364429, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App.
2000).
130Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 523 (Ky. 2001).
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IV. YANERO AND THE KENTUCKY JURAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Yanero can coexist with
Happy because their holdings do not directly conflict with each other.'
The controlling issue in Happy was whether the statute exempting officers
and employees of cities from personal liability in the use of fire apparatus
was constitutional.' As mentioned previously, the court found that this
statute could not be squared with the Kentucky Constitution. 33 Arriving at
this conclusion, the court relied upon its prior decision in Ludwig v.
Johnson.'34 Citing the Ludwig decision, the court in Happy wrote that "the
objective of section 14 [of the Kentucky Constitution] was to preserve
thosejural rights which had become well established prior to the adoption
of the Constitution."'3 5 Creating this concept of jural rights, the court in
Ludwig sought to preserve common law causes of action by constitutionally
validating them through sections 14, 54, and 241.36 The court in Happy
stated that the individuals protected by this statute never had immunity in
the common law.'37 Thus, this legislative act was an overextension of
immunity that unconstitutionally burdened an individual's right to recover
damages. 38
In Yanero, the Kentucky Supreme Court reaffirms that there are certain
types of individuals that should be entitled to immunity created by the
performance of acts of the sovereign. 3 In reaffirming this defense, the
court determines that its decision reflects the proper extension of immunity
based on the common law of Kentucky and an analysis of federal and other
state law jurisdprudence.'4 Thus, while this particular approach is new to
'3' See id. at 510; Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1959).
132 Happy, 330 S.W.2d at 413. It is important to remember that the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Happy never applied or even mentioned the doctrine of
sovereign or official immunity.
3 Id. at 414.
" Id. at 413-14 (citing Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932)).
131 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Ludwig, 49 S.W.2d at 350).
3 Ludwig, 49 S.W.2d at 351.
'3 Happy, 330 S.W.2d at 414.
13 8
.1d.
139 Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001).
"4Id. at 521-23. By overruling Malone and limiting the application of official
immunity, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Yanero is essentially arguing that
Malone was an overextension of immunity that was not a true reflection of the
common law. See id. at 523. Thus, all the cases that allowed official immunity to
individuals performing ministerial actions were an overextension of immunity.
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Kentucky law, Yanero reaffirms that some actions by government agents
traditionally have always been entitled to the official immunity defense.''
The courts in Ludwig and Happy merely sought to prevent the
overextension of immunity, reasoning that "if the Legislature could
immunize certain classes of public officers, it could exempt all public
officers and employees from liability, and if logically extended, could
immunize private groups the Legislature determined to be entitled to
immunity."'42 Yanero signifies that official immunity has always been a
part of Kentucky common law and recognizes that there are still classes of
individuals that are entitled to immunity.
143
In Williams v. Wilson, the Kentucky Supreme Court wrote that the
actual holding in Ludwig was that "the intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to inhibit the Legislature from abolishing rights of action
for damages for death or injuries caused by negligence."'" Yanero
recognizes that in some cases there have never been rights of action for
damages caused by certain individuals engaged in certain activities because
in these cases official immunity has always existed to shield individuals
from liability.14' Thus, the extension of official immunity in Yanero does
not abolish a right to legal action, since injured parties never had this right
from the begining. The model developed in Yanero is an attempt to
reassert the law regarding the proper extension of official immunity, not an
attempt to destroy the jural rights doctrine.
However, even the jural rights doctrine has been sharply criticized by
certain legal scholars. For example, Professor Thomas P. Lewis concluded
that "the formal jural rights doctrine is founded on a misconception of
Kentucky's 1891 constitution. It should be abandoned."' 146 All of the cases
in the Happy progeny bolster their argument limiting official immunity's
application to government agents by reliance on Kentucky Constitution
sections 14, 54, and 241." These constitutional sections make up the
foundation of the jural rights doctrine. 4 Lewis writes that courts cite these
141Id. at 518.
142 Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260,266 (Ky. 1998).
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 518-23.
'44 Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 265 (quoting Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347,
350 (Ky. 1932)).
'45 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521-22.
'46 Thomas P. Lewis, Jural Rights under Kentucky's Constitution: Realities
Grounded in Myth, 80 KY. L.J. 953, 985 (1992).
4' See supra note 93.
141 Ludwig v, Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347,351 (Ky. 1932).
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"open courts" provisions referring to their meaning in "spirit" when "read
together."'49 However, when evaluated individually their language takes on
a much narrower construction. Lewis states:
In combination, the role of section 14 is to guarantee a remedy for injury;
the role of section 54 is to protect the remedy from diminution below what
the court has deemed to be just; and the role of section 241 is to guarantee
a remedy when injury results in death. Thus combined, the provisions
appear as the legs of a tripod carefully constructed by our "founding
fathers" to support a delegation of absolute power to the courts. History
shows that nothing could be further removed from reality.' 50
Professor Lewis could find no evidence that these sections were intended
to be read together as a "package," creating this expansive notion of "open
courts" and jural rights.' However, regardless of his arguments, the
Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the doctrine ofjural rights in its recent
decision, Williams v. Wilson." The court relied on precedent in holding
that these constitutional sections "render certain common law rights
impervious to legislative dilution or destruction. Such rights are therefore
subject to the same restrictions with respect to modification by the General
Assembly as are constitutional provisions."'53 Unconvinced by Lewis'
arguments, the court concluded that "[tihe fact that these provisions might
not have been 'conceived as some sort of package' does not prevent them
from being construed together to arrive at a separate principle."'' "
Even though the doctrine ofjural rights continues to exist in Kentucky
law, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Wood v. Board ofEducation held that
constitutional sections that preserve remedies for injuries do not impinge
upon section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution, the section that has been
construed to recognize the applicability of sovereign and official
immunity. 155 The court wrote that "[s]ection 231 is no late-comer to the
Kentucky Constitution .... Certainly the makers [of the Constitution]
intended Section 231, which has been interpreted as the doctrine of
149 Lewis, supra note 146, at 964.
150 Id.
'5' Id. at 972.
'
52 Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 269 (Ky. 1998).
'
5 1 Id. at 268.
'
54 Id. at 267 (quoting Lewis, supra note 146, at 972).




sovereign immunity, to have some meaning."' 56 The court further wrote that
"[i]t is a cardinal rule of construction that the different sections of the
Constitution shall be construed as a whole so as to harmonize the various
provisions and not to produce a conflict between them."'57 This implies that
even if sections 14, 54, and 241 are read together, section 23 l's recognition
of sovereign and official immunity still prevails. The court concludes that
sovereign immunity must be recognized regardless of what may have been
intended by the sections concerning an individual's right to suit. 58
The end result of this discussion of official immunity and jural rights
is the recognition that there are two distinct theories in Kentucky's legal
system with opposite goals. These theories can be harmonized in the same
way that the Kentucky Supreme Court harmonized the holdings of Happy
and Yanero. Both of these cases and legal theories are right in their defense
of common law principles. Happy and the jural rights doctrine protect
against the overextension of immunity by the legislature, 59 while Yanero
clarifies the official immunity defense to which certain government agents
have been entitled throughout the common law.160 Part V continues this
discussion of Yanero by demonstrating the impact of the new official
immunity standard by applying it to several previously decided Kentucky
Court of Appeals cases.
V. YANERO'S POTENTIAL IMPACT ON FUTURE KENTUCKY CASES
This Part reviews a series of recently decided cases by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals. All of these opinions were rendered prior to the
Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Yanero. These cases are valuable
because they provide a set of facts and conclusions to demonstrate how
Yanero will change the calculus and development of Kentucky official
immunity case law. Prior to Yanero, one of the most troubling aspects of
the official immunity doctrine was that litigants governed by the laws of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky had claims dismissed or upheld by courts that
applied different or conflicting standards. In the unpublished decisions
discussed below, the Kentucky Court of Appeals applied official immunity
inconsistently. Yanero will not solve all the problems inherent in the




59 See Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1959); Ludwig v. Johnson, 49
S.W.2d 347, 351 (Ky. 1932) (setting forth the jural rights doctrine).
16 See Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 521-23 (Ky. 2001).
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official immunity defense, but at least there is now a consistent standard
that courts must apply. 16'
In Carey v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, the first of
these unpublished decisions, Carey, an inmate at the Fayette County
Detention Center, fell and severely injured his leg while working in the
Juvenile Detention Center.1 62 Carey filed suit against the Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Government ("LFUCG"); the Fayette County Jailer, Ray
Sabbatine; and the Director of the Department of General Services, Robert
Ramsey.'63 Here, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that it was premature
for the trial court to dismiss Carey's claims against Sabbatine and Ramsey
on the grounds of official immunity."6 The court wrote that "even though
it may later be determined that Sabbatine and Ramsey are immune from
liability in their official capacity due to the discretionary nature of their
actions, the doctrine of official immunity does not bar a claim based on
their alleged personal negligence." 165 Supporting this conclusion, the Carey
court cited the Happy line of cases and the jural rights doctrine and stated
that "[i]ndividual state employees are accountable for their actions and
torts."' The court completely disregarded the then-prevailingMalone test
pertaining to the application of official immunity to government agents.
In Pirtle v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, Pirtle
suffered injuries while riding in a police transport vehicle to the Fayette
County Detention Center. 67 Pirtle sued LFUCG and two police officers,
Charles Massarone and Stephen Gahafer, for negligent transportation. 161
The court held that official immunity applied, barring the plaintiff's claims
161 One major advantage of Yanero overMalone and the previous cases dealing
with sovereign and official immunity is that Yanero clearly sets forth the standard
that courts must apply to resolve these issues. However, because of the inherent
problems in the application and interpretation of the terms "discretionary" and
"ministerial," the sovereign and official immunity defense continues to be subject
to great debate. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text. Yanero does nothing
to communicate exactly what actions are "discretionary" and what are "ministerial."
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522-23.
162 Careyv. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 2 Ky. APP. NON-PUBLISHED




'66 Id. (quoting Gould v. O'Bannon, 770 S.W.2d 220, 221-22 (Ky. 1989)).67Pirfle v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 2 KY. APP. NON-PUBLISHED




against the government agents. 69 This conclusion, rendered fourteen days
before the Carey decision, did utilize the then-applicable Malone test. 7
The Pirtle court found that the police officers were engaged in a ministerial
act, within the scope of the authority of their office, and within the
traditional role of government."'
In Clarkv. Daviess County, the estate of Candice Clark, who was killed
in an automobile accident, sued Daviess County, its present and former
fiscal court members, the Daviess County road foreman, the Daviess
County Road Department sign director, the present and former Daviess
County engineer, and the assistant Daviess County engineer."2 The plaintiff
alleged that these defendants negligently failed to exercise ordinary care to
provide and maintain any notice or warning of the curved roadway or to
provide an appropriate guardrail at the portion of the roadway involved in
the accident."' The Kentucky Court of Appeals found that official
immunity applied to the government agents, shielding them from any
liability."7 The court justified its conclusion by holding that the individuals
acted within their discretionary authority.7 Interestingly, the opinion stated
that under the former Malone standard, the doctrine of official immunity
did not apply to ministerial acts. 76 This is true now because of the Yanero
decision,'77 but it was a clear misstatement under the then-prevailing
Malone test' 78
These three cases illustrate two critical points: first, they show that
Malone was applied inconsistently, demonstrating the clear need for
uniformity, and second, they demonstrate how Yanero will cause some
cases to be decided differently, while leaving others unaffected. In three
months, the Court of Appeals applied three different standards regarding
official immunity in three separate cases. Although two of the outcomes




172 Clark v. Daviess County, 2 KY. APP. NON-PUBLISHED OPINIONS 20, at 14





7 See Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001).
'71 See Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1997), ovemded by
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523; see also supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
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demonstrating a clear need for uniformity in the law. Yanero addresses this
problem by clearly stating a standard that Kentucky courts must uniformly
apply in official immunity cases."'
If the Yanero approach were applied to these three cases, two of the
three would likely be resolved differently. In Carey, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that the Happy rationale applied, preserving the rights of
injured citizens to bring suit.' Yanero clearly decides that all official
immunity suits should be channeled through the previously discussed
approach that the opinion lays out.' If Yanero applied, the defendants in
Carey probably would be entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of
official immunity. The Carey court specifically stipulates that the
defendants acted within their discretionary authority.8 2 Discretionary acts
qualify for immunity under Yanero, as long as the defendants acted within
the scope of their employment and the plaintiffs are unable to show they
acted in bad faith.'
Pirtle would also be resolved differently under the Yanero analysis. In
Pirtle, the defendants were found to have acted within their ministerial
authority.'4 They were entitled to official immunity under Malone through
the "traditional role of government" exception created for ministerial
acts. 5 Yanero does not provide for such exception for ministerial acts."6
No action of this nature is afforded official immunity 87
In Clark, the Kentucky Court of Appeals found that the defendants
were entitled to the official immunity defense. 88 Citing the Malone
standard, the court found the defendants had immunity because they acted
within their discretionary authority. 8 9 Under Yanero, the result in Clark
would be the same, then, as long as the government agents performed a
discretionary action within the scope of their employment and did so in
'19 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521-23.
180 Careyv. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't 2 Ky. APP. NON-PUBLISHED
OPIoNS 15, at 3 (Ky. Ct. App., 1999-CA-1297-MR, Aug. 10, 2001).
181 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521-23.
182 Carey, 2 KY. APP. NON-PUBLISHED OPINIONS at 3.
113 Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523.
'"Pirtle v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 2 KY. APP. NON-PUBLISHED
OPINIONS 14, at 26 (Ky. Ct. App., 2000-CA-1603-1R, July 27,2001).
18 5 1d.




18 Clark v. Daviess County, 2 Ky. APP. NON-PUBLISHED OPINIONS 20, at 14
(Ky. Ct. App. 2000-CA-2910-MR, Oct. 19,2001).
189 Id.
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good faith.'9 0 As long as the plaintiffs are unable to show bad faith, the
defendants would be afforded immunity under the Yanero approach.'
Clearly, the biggest change Yanero mandates is that ministerial actions will
no longer be given any immunity. 92 Furthermore, Yanero now provides a
uniform standard that should remove some of the ambiguity and inconsis-
tent application of the official immunity doctrine.
CONCLUSION
In deciding Yanero, the Kentucky Supreme Court clearly is attempting
to rectify the status of Kentucky law regarding official immunity. In
Yanero, the court states that prior to Malone, "no Kentucky case had ever
held that a public employee was afforded absolute immunity for the
negligent performance of a ministerial act simply because that act was a
governmental function performed within the scope of the authority of the
employee's office."'93 Thus, Yanero serves to restore Kentucky official
immunity law to its common law tradition before Malone.
The doctrine of official immunity is subject to a great deal of debate
because it strikes at an individual's right to recover damages for her
injuries, a right that many Americans hold as sacred in the justice system.
Judge Learned Hand wrote eloquently in Gregoire v. Biddle about the
problems regarding this debate:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty
of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other
personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape
liability for the injuries he may so cause .... There must indeed be means
of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties; but that
is quite another matter from exposing such as have been honestly
mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. As is so
often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils
inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the
end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation. 194




194 Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
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In Yanero, the Kentucky Supreme Court attempts to create a model that
will balance the interests of the people in recovering damages for their
injuries and in protecting the government from harassing lawsuits. More
importantly, the court eliminates the standard developed in Malone,
replaces it with a model that more truly conforms to the weight of the
Kentucky common law, and provides a uniform approach to apply the
doctrine. The Kentucky Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Yanero
sends the resounding message that Kentucky now has an unvarying
standard. However, the question remains how fundamental terms such as
"discretionary" and "ministerial" will be interpreted so as to apply this
defense in the future. Fortunately, now that there is a clear context and
structure to apply official immunity, this highly debatable issue can be
isolated, allowing the courts and practitioners to develop the law by
providing fact patterns and analogies to help define these crucial terms.

